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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ANDREW GEORGE KISH, a/k/a 
WILLIAM WALTER SNYDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
13004 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was originally charged with a codefendant. 
Appellant was granted a separate trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A jury found appellant guilty of assault with intent 
to commit robbery from which appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the verdict of the trial court 
be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated 
by appellant except as hereinafter set forth. 
During the hearing in which the court granted a mo-
tion to sever appellant's case from that of his codefendant, 
appellant said: "That wasn't the main problem, you 
know, I was trying to bring up, it was just the fact that 
I wanted a jury trial." The court said, "All right, and you 
are going to have a jury trial." Appellant replied, "Right. 
So I am satisfied with that, then." (March 17, 1972, T.R. 
14). 
During appellant's trial, counsel for appellant moved 
for a mistrial when counsel for the state indicated it might 
call the codfendant as a witness. When the state indi-
cated that it might not call the codefendant, counsel for 
appellant said: "Well, if he is not called, I see no prob-
lem." (March 20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 15). 
Before trial, appellant was given a voluntary state-
ment form which contained a printed portion. He filled 
it in and signed it. (March 17, 1972, T.R. 42-43). The 
court sustained appellant's motion to suppress because 
the facts did not shown that appellant read it or that it 
was read to him. Part of the printed portion contained 
a waiver of the right to presence of counsel (March 20 
and 21, 1972, T.R. 3-4). 
One witness was called who had not been endorsed. 
The court allowed his testimony only to the extent that 
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it laid a foundation regarding the security of the exhibits 
held in the police office. (Supra at 121). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT HAD IN-
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO 
JUSTIFY APPOINTMENT OF SEPARATE 
COUNSEL, IT DID NOT ERR. 
Unless there is a conflict of interest or prejudice, 
courts have allowed codefendants to be represented by 
the same attorney and such representation has not been 
held a denial of effective assistance of counsel per se. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "The sixth 
amendment is not violated by joint representation of co-
defendants unless a conflict of interest or prejudice results 
from such procedure." Fryar v. United States, 404 F. 2d 
1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968). This court has indirectly so 
held in the peculiar fact situation in Combs v. Turner, 25 
Utah 2d 397, 483 P. 2d 437 (1971). 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in State v. Andrews, 
106 Ariz. 372, 476 P. 2d 673, 678 (1970), held: 
"In order for assistance by counsel for an ac-
cused to be impaired by representation of the same 
attorney, actual conflict must in fact have existed 
or be inherent in the facts of the case from which 
a possibility of prejudice flows." 
The facts of the case must be analyzed to decide whether 
an actual conflict exists. In McHenry v. United States, 
420 F. 2d 927, 928 (10th Cir. 1970), the court held: 
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"So, too, codefendants may have effective rep-
resentation by a single attorney under circum-
stance that negative a conflict of interest. Each 
issue must be considered under the totality of cir-
cumstances that prevailed during all the pre-trial 
and trial proceedings." 
The record in the present case does not support the 
contention that between the codefendants there existed 
an actual or potential conflict of interest, or a possibility 
of prejudice. Before trial, the lower court held a hearing 
on March 17, 1972, during which the court granted a mo-
tion to sever appellant's case from that of his codefendant, 
Mr. Vincent. After assuring appellant that he and Mr. 
Vincent would not be tried at the same time, the court 
asked appellant if he still claimed relief under the motion 
for other counsel. Appellant said: "That wasn't the main 
problem, you know, I was trying to bring up, it was just 
the fact that I wanted a jury trial." The court said, "All 
right, and you are going to have a jury trial." Appellant 
replied, "Right. So I am satisfied with that, then." 
(March 17, 1972, T.R. 14). 
During appellant's trial, counsel for appellant had a 
"visceral feeling" that there would be a conflict of inter-
est if Mr. Vincent were called as a witness. Counsel for 
appellant said, "I would have to move that if Mr. Vincent 
is called as a witness that a mistrial be declared inasmuch 
as I have confidential information." Counsel for the state 
indicated that Mr. Vincent may not be called. Counsel 
for appellant then said, "Well, if he is not called I see no 
problem but if he were called at that point I would re-
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quest permission at that point to renew my motion for a 
mistrial." (March 20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 15). Mr. Vincent 
was not called as a witness. 
No attempt was made on behalf of appellant to bring 
forth facts upon which the lower court could have reason 
to substitute separate counsel for appellant. Both times 
that the issue of conflict between codefendants was pre-
sented to the court as stated above, either appellant him-
self or his counsel was satisfied with the court's solution. 
Since the record is devoid of evidence it is improper to 
contend that the court erred in failing to substitute sepa-
rate counsel when in fact appellant failed to show the 
court why it should appoint substitute counsel. 
Counsel for appellant contends that the reason he 
was unable to argue and expound upon the reasons for 
the appointment of separate counsel was because of his 
concern that anything he might say to the court "might 
in fact be harmful or deleterious to the cases of one or the 
other of his two clients." (Appellant's Brief at p. 24). 
Counsel's reasons for believing there was a potential con-
flict of interest were not part of the record. Counsel for 
appellant stated in Appellant's Brief that the sources of 
potential conflict were largely based (1) on concern over 
upsetting negotiations for Mr. Vincent (P. 18-20), and 
(2) on what Mr. Vincent might say if called as a witness 
(P. 20-21). Both of these concerns are more properly 
described as trial tactics and in absence of clear error are 
generally not subject to appellate review. In any event, 
these concerns should have been raised in the lower court. 
If the lower court does commit error, this court is compe-
tent to correct such error. However, fear that a lower 
court might err should not justify a defendant in refrain-
ing from presenting his best case to that court. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A 
COURT IMPOSE IDENTICAL SENTENCES 
WHEN ONE CODEFENDANT PLEADS 
GUILTY TO A LESSER CRIME AND THE 
OTHER CHOOSES A JURY TRIAL ON THE 
GREATER. 
The court in Cuzick v. State, 4 Ariz. App. 455, 421 
P. 2d 537, 538 (1966), held, "There is no requirement 
that the court impose identical sentences upon codefen-
dants." In this case, appellant, a codefendant, pled guilty 
to first degree burglary and was sentenced to a prison 
term of not less than five nor more than eight years. 
Later, the st.ate amended the information to second degree 
burglary, to which the other codefendant, his brother, 
pied guilty and received a sentence of not less than four 
and one-half nor more than five years imprisonment. 
The court held: 
"The appellant could not complain ( 1) if the 
prosecutor failed to prosecute his brother, or (2) 
if a jury convicted him and acquitted his brother, 
or (3) if identical sentences were not imposed on 
both." Id. 
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In the present case, appellant was given the oppor-
tunity to plead guilty to a lesser charge (March 17, 1972, 
T.R. 4). Appellant chose a jury trial and was convicted. 
Since there is no requirement that identical sentence be 
imposed upon codefendants, the fact that Mr. Vincent 
pled guilty to a lesser crime really has no bearing on ap-
pellant's lawfully imposed sentence. 
POINT III. 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS MADE BY 
AN ACCUSED WHICH ARE NOT IN COM-
PLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
MIRANDA, MAY BE ADMISSIBLE TO IM-
PEACH THE ACCUSED'S CREDIBILITY. 
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), a de-
fendant allegedly made statements at a police interroga-
tion. The evidence did not show that the defendant was 
warned of his right to appointed counsel before he an-
swered the questions put to him. No question was raised 
as to the voluntariness of the statements. The statements 
were not used in the prosecution's case in chief but were 
used for purposes of impeaching defendant's credibility. 
In upholding the use of the statements for impeachment 
purposes the court said: "The shield provided by 
Miranda cannot be prevented into a license to use perjury 
by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation 
with prior inconsistent utterances." Id. at 226. Thus, it 
is clear that inconsistent statements made by an accused 
may be used for impeachment purposes. 
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In the present case, appellant stated that he would 
write a statement. He was given a form for making a 
voluntary statement which contained a printed portion. 
The printed portion was not read t.o the appellant; he 
was only t.old t.o fill in the blanks and sign it. Appellant 
wrote for about fifteen minutes and then signed it (March 
17, 1972, T.R. 42-43). The court sustained appellant's 
motion t.o suppress because the facts did not show that 
appellant had read the printed portion or that it was read 
t.o appellant. Part of the printed portion contained a 
waiver of the right t.o presence of counsel (March 20 and 
21, 1972, T.R. 3-4). Since appellant raises no issue as t.o 
the voluntariness of his statement, since the statement 
was never used, and since the Supreme Court has upheld 
the use of prior statements for impeachment purposes, 
there was no error on the part of the lower court when it 
stated: 
"[l]t may be that upon a proper presentation 
the District Att.omey can use that for impeach-
ment purposes and you may stand forewarned of 
that fact." (March 20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 4-5). 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO MATERIAL PREJUDICE 
RESULTING FROM THE MANNER IN 
WHICH THE NAMES OF THE WITNESSES 
WERE ENDORSED ON THE INFORMA-
TION. 
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This court in State v. Redmond, 19 Utah 2d 272, 430 
P. 2d 901, 904 (1967), stated: 
"Courts have consistently held that the en-
dorsement of additional names of witnesses on the 
Information even during trial rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and material prejudice 
must be shown before it constitutes reversible 
error." 
In the present case there was no showing of material 
prejudice. Counsel for appellant objected to the omission 
of certain names from the amended information (March 
'20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 12). Counsel for the state reminded 
counsel for appellant that the names were included in the 
bill of particulars. The court granted appellant's motion 
(Supra at 14). However, one name was left off and coun-
sel for appellant objected (Supra at 120). The court 
overruled the objection because the only purpose of call-
ing the witness was to lay a foundation regarding the 
security of the exhibits held m the police office (Supra 
at 121). Appellant has not shown any prejudice, and 
certainly no material prejudice, in the manner in which 
the names of the witnesses were endorsed on the informa-
tion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts contained in the record of the lower court 
show no error in failing to substitute counsel or prejudice 
in the manner of endorsing witnesses. It is also clear that 
the law does not require a codefendant to receive an 
identical sentence or that inconsistent statements be ex-
cluded for purposes of impeachment. Wherefore, the con-
viction of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID R. IRVINE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
